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Household Energy Demand and the Equity and Efficiency Aspects of 







The proper design of price interventions requires consideration of equity and efficiency effects. 
In this paper, budget survey data from 29,000 Indonesian households are used to estimate a 
demand system for five energy sources, which is identified by the spatial variation in unit 
values (expenditures divided by quantities). We correct for the various quality and 
measurement error biases that result when unit values are used as proxies for market prices. 
The price elasticities are combined with tax and subsidy rates to calculate the marginal social 
cost of price changes for each item. The results suggest that even at high levels of inequality 
aversion there is a strong case for reducing the large subsidies on gasoline and kerosene, 
supporting the reforms that have been carried out recently. 
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I. Introduction 
  Managing the demand for energy is emerging as a critical policy issue as world fuel prices 
continue to rise sharply. While popular attention has focused on the plight of consumers in 
developed countries, the need for adjustment is likely to be far higher in some developing countries 
as energy markets in some developing countries are highly distorted, especially from consumer 
subsidies (IEA, 1999). For example, the Government of Indonesia spent over US$ 6 billion on 
consumer fuel subsidies in 2004. These subsidies have a major effect on the overall energy balance 
in Indonesia because households account for about 45 percent of total energy consumption. The 
subsidies also have large fiscal effects – rising world oil prices had caused spending on fuel 
subsidies for 2005 to rise as high as US$ 13 billion, which is about one-quarter of the government 
budget (Sen and Steer, 2005)  
  Dramatic reforms have been attempted in response to this escalating cost of fuel subsidies. 
In October 2005, the subsidised price of kerosene was raised 186 percent, from Rp 700 per litre to 
Rp 2000 per litre
1 (Table 1). The prices for diesel and gasoline were raised by approximately 90 
percent, following on from increases of 30 percent in March 2005. As a result of the price 
increases, domestic fuel prices in Indonesia are now closer to international prices – kerosene, 
gasoline and diesel are now 31 percent, 68 percent and 68 percent of international prices 
respectively (World Bank, 2005). Moreover, a timetable has been set for completely phasing out 
fuel subsidies, with those on gasoline and diesel to go by the end of 2006 and those on kerosene by 
the end of 2007. These energy subsidies are to be replaced with a set of targeted subsidies, whose 
benefits are meant to be restricted to low-income groups (Kompas, 2005 and Jakarta Post, 2005). 
   It is unclear whether these ambitious plans for reform will be realised because many 
previous attempts at reforming energy price policy in Indonesia have caused political 
difficulties. Attempted reforms in 2003 were reversed after widespread protests while the price 
 
1 As of April 2006, 1US$ ≈ Rp. 8,900.  3
rises in 1998 are believed to have precipitated the downfall of the Suharto regime (Economist, 
2005). Moreover, these subsidies have been long-term features of the Indonesian economy, 
dating back to the mid 1970s (Dick, 1980). The subsidization of especially kerosene has been 
seen as one feasible way of meeting equity objectives, because the poor use kerosene as their 
main cooking fuel. This reliance on energy subsidies reflect the limited capacity for income 
transfers, which is a feature of many developing countries. Even though there was early 
evidence that a disproportionate share of the subsidy was being captured by richer urban 
households, the subsidy policy continued to be strengthened such that at the end of 1980, the 
price of kerosene was only 18 percent of world prices (Pitt, 1985) 
  The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence to help assess whether the 
proposed reforms of energy price policy in Indonesia are likely to be welfare-enhancing. 
Specifically, we analyse the equity and efficiency of price reform in the household energy 
sector in Indonesia. To achieve this objective we estimate the marginal social costs of indirect 
taxes and subsidies on five fuels and energy sources; kerosene, gasoline, lubricant oil, LPG, 
and electricity. These marginal social costs depend on the rate at which household welfare falls 
as prices increase, and on the rate at which public revenue rises (Ahmad and Stern, 1984). If a 
reform is optimally designed, the costs in terms of social welfare of the last dollar saved by 
cutting subsidies on each good should be equal. To obtain the two required parameters – the 
welfare derivative and the revenue derivative – information is needed on tax rates, 
consumption patterns, and aggregate demand responses. The analysis follows the 
recommendation of Newbery (2005) to use the basic principles of public finance to introduce 
order into discussions of how energy taxes and subsidies might rationally be set. 
  Energy subsidies in Indonesia have previously been discussed by Pitt (1985) who 
concluded that the price of kerosene should be increased on both equity and efficiency 
grounds. In part this conclusion rested on an estimate of the elasticity of kerosene  4
consumption with respect to its own price of -1.04, suggesting that price distortions would 
create large substitution effects. One concern is that this elasticity is calculated from household 
survey data, with prices proxied by unit values (expenditures divided by quantities). Deaton 
(1990) shows that treating unit values as prices is likely to lead to elasticities being too large in 
absolute terms.  This potential bias in consistent with time series estimates of the own-price 
elasticity of kerosene demand in Indonesia being between -0.3 and -0.5 (Summers, 1979).  
  To measure the required price responses more accurately, we use methods developed 
by Deaton (1990) to correct biases that result from using these data rather than actual market 
prices. It will, thus, be one of the few studies that uses this novel source of information to fill 
in the gaps which have previously prevented empirical analysis of tax and subsidy reform in 
many developing countries. 
 
II.  The Marginal Tax Reform Approach 
  Unlike the traditional optimal tax literature, which attempts to derive those tax rates that 
minimize welfare loss for the collection of a given revenue, marginal tax reform takes the existing 
tax system as given. The aim of the analysis is to identify the directions of reforms at the margin, 
taking the existing tax system as given, which may be more relevant for policy makers (Ahmad and 
Stern, 1984). Specifically, a decrease in the subsidy rate, τi on good i, (or equivalently, a tax 
increase) will cause welfare to change at rate  i V τ ∂ ∂ /  and revenue to change at rate  i R τ ∂ ∂ /.  T h e  
ratio of these two derivatives gives the marginal social cost,  i λ  of saving one unit of revenue by 
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Goods with low  i λ  ratios are those that are candidates for either a tax increase or a subsidy 
reduction. When all the ratios are the same there is no scope for beneficial reform.  5
This approach can be implemented by noting that the numerator of (1) is just the ratio 
of two average budget shares:  i i w w ~ ε  (Deaton, 1997). The first average budget share,
ε
i w  is 
weighted to reflect equity considerations: 
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where wim is the budget share for good i in household m, xm and nm are the total expenditure and 
size of household m, and ε   is the coefficient of inequality aversion.
2 A range of values between 
zero (no inequality aversion) and two (a high degree of inequality aversion) are commonly 
used to see whether tax reform recommendations are robust to particular ethical judgements 
(Ahmad and Stern, 1984). In terms of the calculation of equation (2), the larger is ε  the closer 
the average budget share will be to budget shares of the poorest households in the sample. The 
second average budget share is the so-called ‘plutocratic budget share’ which is based on 
ratios of total expenditures and gives the biggest weights to the richest households: 
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  The denominator of the λ -ratio represents the efficiency aspect of tax- and subsidy-induced 
price changes. A given change in the tax rate will produce a larger revenue effect, the greater is the 
total consumption of the good and the less the substitution away from taxed goods: 





































The total consumption of the good is shown by i w % , while the substitution effects are shown by  , ki θ  
the derivative of the budget share for good k with respect to the (log) price of good i. The tax 
 
2 Consider judgements about the effect of taking Rp1000 from someone to give some of it to a person with half 
the income and destroying the rest (e.g., due to efficiency losses). When ε =0 the judge would approve of this 
transfer only if the poorer person received all Rp1000. But when ε   takes the values of 1 (or 2) the amount the 
poorer person receives has to be only Rp500 (or Rp250 if ε =2) in order for the resulting distribution to be 
judged as giving the same level of social welfare as before the transfer (Creedy, 1996).   6
factor gives the share of tax in the final price. For example, lubricant oil faces a VAT rate of 10 
percent in Indonesia, so the tax factor is 0.10 (1 0.10) 0.09, += while kerosene prices are only 31 
percent of the prices in other countries, so the tax factor is  0.69 (1 0.69) 2.23. −− = −  The first 
term of the denominator in equation (4) measures the own-price distortionary effect of the tax 
or subsidy. If it is large and positive, as would be the case for a heavily subsidised and price 
elastic good, the term will contribute to a small i λ and would indicate the low cost of saving 
fiscal expenditures from decreases in the subsidy on this good. The last term is the sum of the 
tax factors multiplied by the cross price elasticities, and captures the effects on other goods 
(and the resulting revenue changes) from the change in the tax on good i. 
 
III.  Data and Estimation Methods 
Data from the consumption module of the 1999 SUSENAS survey are used for 28,964 
households located on Java.
3 Respondents in this survey are asked to recall their expenditures 
over the past month for approximately 300 different products. For food, fuels and electricity 
they are also asked about the quantity purchased so that unit values can be derived. These unit 
values are needed because the survey does not collect market prices. The survey’s sampling 
procedure involves selecting clusters of up to sixteen households within districts and regions. 
This spatial clustering encourages the assumption that households within each cluster face the 
same prices and this feature is exploited by the estimation method used below. 
The five energy products considered – electricity, LPG, kerosene, gasoline and lubricant oil 
contribute almost 4.4 percent of the average budget, ranging from LPG at 0.14 percent to 
electricity at 1.82 (Table 2). The first three columns of Table 2 describe some of the characteristics 
of the unit values. Items like electricity and kerosene have unit values available for almost every 
 
3 Java contains approximately 60 percent of the Indonesian population and, economic activity is also 
concentrated there, so the results should still be relevant to nationwide price reform.  7
household while information for items like LPG and gasoline is much less readily available. Means 
of unit values are also shown in the table. These are computed from those households who make 
market purchases of the commodity under consideration. The coefficient of variation indicates the 
degree of heterogeneity within each group, which is least for commodities like kerosene and 
gasoline where there is little quality variation.  
The procedure used to get the price responses needed for the marginal reform calculations 
starts with a two-equation system of budget shares (wGic ) and unit values (vGic) that are both 
functions of the unobserved prices, (pHc ): 
) 5 ( ln ln )   u   +   f (   +   p         +   z       +   x       =     =   w
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the  G  indicates goods, i  indicates households and the c indexes clusters. Amongst the 
explanatory variables, xi is total expenditure of household i, pH are the unobserved prices, zi is 
a vector of other household characteristics,  fGc is a cluster fixed-effect in the budget share for 
good G  and u
0
c   i G   and u
1
c   i G   are idiosyncratic errors.  
  In the first stage, the procedure removes the household-specific effects of income and 
other demographic characteristics from the budget shares and unit values.  To do so, equations 
(5) and (6) are estimated using OLS with dummy variables for each cluster in place of the 
unobserved price (a ‘within’ estimator).  In addition to xi and zi, this specification also controls 
for all cluster fixed effects, including those of unobserved prices, so the 
1 1 0 0 and , , , G G G G γ β γ β  
parameters can be estimated consistently, even in the absence of market price data.  These four 
parameters are used to create adjusted budget shares and unit values that have the quality 
effects due to income and other factors removed. The first stage regressions also produce 
residuals needed in the second stage for estimating the covariances that are used to correct for  8
the effect of any measurement error in unit values and budget shares.  The error terms, 
1 0 and Gic Gic e e , from equations (5) and (6) contain all the variability in w Gc and vGc that are not 
explained by x,  z, or the cluster fixed effects. Assuming a single price per cluster, the 
unexplained variation around the cluster mean can indicate measurement error.  
  In the second stage of the Deaton procedure, a between-clusters errors-in-variables 
regression is applied to the (adjusted) average budget shares and unit values, which have been 
purged of household characteristics at the first stage.  If it were not for the effect of prices on 
cluster-wide quality variation, the parameters estimated at the second stage would be sufficient 
for calculating the price responses. Instead, a separability theory of quality (Deaton 1988) has 
to be used to identify the price effects at the third and final stage. 
 
IV. Econometric  Results 
The first stage (within-cluster) estimation of the budget share equations explains from 
47 percent (kerosene) to 27 percent (lubricant oil) of the variation in budget shares (see Table 
3).
4 The budget share equations also indicate three luxury goods – gasoline, LPG and lubricant 
oil, each with expenditure elasticities between 2.69 and 2.80. Kerosene has an expenditure 
elasticity of 0.43 and for electricity it is 1.10. The only unit value to show any response to 
household expenditures is lubricant oil, where the quality elasticity, is 0.07. 
Table 4 contains the estimated own- and cross-price elasticities. The symmetry 
restrictions from demand theory have been imposed on these estimates. In addition to the 
five energy sources, there is an extra row and column for “other consumption”, the estimates 
for which are obtained from the homogeneity and adding-up restrictions. The elasticities are 
conditional not only on household size and the dummy variables for household characteristics 
 
4 In addition to total expenditures, the other variables used at the first stage include (log) household size, a set 
of demographic variables (the number of household members in each of thirteen age and sex categories as a  9
mentioned above, but also on a set of province and urban dummy variables. These dummy 
variables are used at the second stage (between-clusters) to control for any longer-term 
interregional price differences.
5 Such controls are needed because Deaton (1997) argues that 
the response to price changes in the short-run is most relevant for evaluating tax and subsidy 
reform. 
In addition to the price elasticities, the table also include bootstrapped estimates of 
“standard errors”. To calculate these standard errors, 1000 random draws are taken from the 
second stage data (i.e., the cluster average budget shares and unit values, after the effect of 
household total expenditures and other characteristics have been controlled for). For each of 
these random draws, all of the elasticities are recalculated, in effect creating 1000 versions of 
Table  4. The length of the interval around the mean of each bootstrapped elasticity that 
contains 63.8 percent of the bootstrap replications is calculated and one-half of this interval is 
used as the estimate of the standard error. The rationale is that if the distribution of the 
elasticity estimates was normal, 0.638 is the fraction of a normal random variable within two 
standard deviations of the mean (Deaton, 1997).  
The estimated own-price elasticity of demand for kerosene is -0.96 (with a standard 
error of 0.11). This is close to the estimate obtained by Pitt (1985) who also used household 
survey data, but without the corrections for the possible biases caused by unit values that 
Deaton (1990) introduced. The similarity of elasticity estimates, and the contrasts from the 
time series estimates, suggests that Pitt’s conclusion that it would be both equitable and 
efficient to reduce the subsidy on kerosene may in fact have been correct. The own-price 
elasticities are also large (in absolute terms) for electricity and LPG, although only the one for 
 
ratio of household size), and nine educational dummies. These variables are based on those used by Deaton 
(1990). 
5 It is not possible to add them at the first (within-cluster) stage because the cluster fixed effects would 
obliterate them.  10
electricity is precisely estimated. This suggests that subsidies will have caused a considerable 
amount of substitution into these products. 
 
V.  Marginal Social Cost Calculations 
Table 5 shows the efficiency effects of cutting subsidies (or raising taxes) on each of 
the goods, distinguishing between the terms in the denominator of equation (4). The first 
column shows the tax factors, while the second column shows the own price elasticities of 
quality and quantity together. The product of the first and second columns, which is shown as 
the third column, gives the own-good contributions to the tax distortion that would be caused 
by a marginal increase in price. The largest effects are for kerosene and then electricity, for 
whom raising prices would save the largest amount from the government’s subsidy budget 
(ignoring any cross-price effects). However, the cross-effects are largest for gasoline and LPG 
and once these are taken account of, the most attractive candidate for price rises are kerosene 
followed by gasoline. 
In Table 6, the results of bringing in the equity effects are reported for a range of values of 
the distributional parameter ε . The first two columns are for  0 = ε   where there are no 
distributional concerns; the cost-benefit ratios are simply the reciprocals of the last column in 
Table 5 and give the same ranking of the relative tax costs. The marginal cost of raising 
kerosene prices is lowest, and for raising lubricant oil prices (which are already taxed) is 
highest amongst the fuels. However, all of the λi for the energy sources are much lower than 
for “other consumption” indicating the general desirability of removing energy subsidies.  
Moving across to the right-hand side of Table 6, equity effects become increasingly 
stronger, and kerosene loses its place as the most attractive candidate for a price rise. Instead, with 
an inequality aversion parameter of ε =2 the lowest cost of additional revenue would come from  11
raising LPG prices, followed by gasoline prices. The best candidate for a subsidy at these higher 
inequality aversion levels is electricity. 
 
VI.       Conclusions 
In this paper we have used household budget survey data from Java to estimate the 
marginal social cost of indirect taxes and subsidies on five energy sources. Regardless of 
assumptions about inequality aversion, all of these energy sources are attractive candidates for 
price increases, when compared with the social cost of revenue raised from taxes on other 
goods and services. From a policy perspective, the results suggest that there is a strong case 
for reducing the large subsidies on gasoline and kerosene in Indonesia, supporting the reforms 
that have been carried out recently. 
In terms of methodology, the main feature of the study is that we correct for the biases 
that are likely to affect price elasticities estimated from unit values. To the extent that most 
other countries have household budget surveys like the one used here, this method could be 
used more widely to provide some empirical underpinnings to recommendations about price 
reforms.  12
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Table 1. Developments of Regulated Fuel Products Prices (Rupiah per litre) 
 
  Jan 2003-Feb 2005  Mar-Sep 2005  October 2005 
  Fixed Price  Price  % change 
from Feb 05 
Price %  change 
from Mar 05 
% change 
from Feb 05 
Gasoline  1,810  2,400 33% 4,500 88% 149% 
Kerosene 
(household) 
700 700  0%  2,000  186%  186% 
Automotive 
Diesel 
1,650 2,100  27%  4,300  105%  161% 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
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Electricity  26,536  191.475  0.684 1,817 26,952 1.816 
LPG 2,321  1,346.07  0.189  650  2,334  0.142 
Kerosene  23,677  456.074  0.160 1,846 23,967 1.470 
Gasoline  5,735  1,014.38  0.094  1,430 5,784 0.735 
Lubricant  Oil  3,698  1,056.44  0.617  1,430 5,238 0.199 
Note: (a) is the number of households with a well-defined unit value, which equals the number of purchasing  
               households minus those who report in irregular units. 
          (b) in Rupiah. 
 
 
Table 3. First Stage Estimates: Effect of Total Expenditures on Quantity and Quality for Java   
 
  Budget Share Equation    Unit Value Equation   
Commodities 
o β
  ) (
o t β   R
2  1 β   ) (
1 β t   R
2  ε  
Electricity -0.0003  -1.320  0.313  -0.0302  -4.460  0.593  1.104 
LPG 0.0025  25.660  0.310  -0.0150  -0.950  0.500  2.740 
Kerosene -0.0083  -36.790  0.467  0.0004  0.110  0.344  0.435 
Gasoline 0.0123  37.600  0.326  -0.0121  -1.600  0.312  2.691 
Lubricant Oil  0.0037  28.020  0.273  0.0745  3.580  0.661  2.800 
Note: 
o β is the derivative of the budget share with respect to log total expenditures, 
1 β  is the derivative of the (log) unit 
value with respect to log total expenditures (a.k.a. the ‘quality elasticity’),  R
2 is for the budget share and unit value 
regressions,  and ε  is the expenditure elasticity of quantity. 
  15
 
 Table 4.   Symmetry Constrained Estimates of Own and Cross Price Elasticities for Java, 1999 
   Electricity  LPG  Kerosene  Gasoline  Lubricant Oil  Other Cons 
Electricity      -1.043*  -0.006 -0.081* -0.068 -0.025 0.239* 
   (0.02)  (0.02) (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
LPG -0.108  -0.321 -0.226 -6.017 -0.260  4.207 
   (0.21)  (0.89) (0.97)  (4.42)  (0.30)  (3.51) 
Kerosene -0.073*  -0.015    -0.960* -0.406 -0.059 1.160* 
   (0.03)  (0.08) (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.04)  (0.22) 
Gasoline -0.198  -1.164 -1.030  -0.080 0.214 -0.421 
   (0.13)  (0.85) (0.65)  (1.28)  (0.15)  (0.87) 
Lubricant Oil  -0.262  -0.186 -0.570  0.791 -0.382*  -2.265* 
   (0.15)  (0.21) (0.32)  (0.54)  (0.14)  (0.67) 
Other Cons  -0.001  -0.002 -0.004  -0.002 0.000  -0.263 
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.37) 
 Note: Standard error in ( ); * statistically significant at 5% level. Results for “Other Cons” derived   
from homogeneity and adding up restriction. 
 
 












θ   Own effect  Cross effects  Total 
Electricity -1.60  -1.05 1.69  0.24  2.93 
LPG -0.43  -0.63  0.27  1.57  2.84 
Kerosene -2.23  -1.61  3.58 0.47  5.05 
Gasoline -0.47  0.00  0.00  2.03  3.03 
Lubricant Oil  0.09  -0.59  -0.05  0.95  1.90 
Other 




Table 6. Equity Effects and Cost-Benefit Ratios for Price Reform in Java with Symmetry 
Restrictions 
    0 = ε     5 . 0 = ε     1 = ε     2 = ε  
Commodities  w w ~ ε   λ   w w ~ ε   λ   w w ~ ε λ   w w ~ ε   λ  
Electricity  1.00 0.34  0.95 0.33  0.91 0.31  0.85 0.29 
LPG  1.00 0.35  0.78 0.27  0.58 0.20  0.29 0.10 
Kerosene  1.00 0.20  1.11 0.22  1.17 0.23  1.19 0.24 
Gasoline  1.00 0.33  0.82 0.27  0.67 0.22  0.47 0.15 
Lubricant  Oil  1.00 0.53  0.79 0.42  0.64 0.34  0.44 0.23 
Other 
consumption  1.00 1.19  1.00 1.20  1.01 1.20  1.01 1.21 
 
 